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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Abortion in the United States has long been a subject of great con-
troversy. In 1821, the Connecticut General Assembly became the first 
state to pass a law restricting abortion.1 Since then, many state legisla-
tures have passed laws regulating, restricting, or even seeking to elimi-
nate abortion procedures within the state.2 Opponents commonly refer to 
these statutes as Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers (TRAP) 
laws.3 Frequently, these laws come in the form of medical regulations 
and place a disproportionate burden on abortion clinics as opposed to 
other clinics that perform outpatient procedures.4 Since 2010, there has 
 
* J.D. Candidate, The University of Akron School of Law. Editor-in-Chief, 2015-2016 Akron Law 
Review. B.A. in International Affairs, The George Washington University, 2012. The author would 
like to thank the Akron Law Review staff who contributed their time to reviewing and editing this 
article, and Professor Bernadette Genetin for all that she does for the Akron Law Review. 
 1.  Linda Greenhouse, Before (and After) Roe v. Wade: New Questions About Backlash, 120 
YALE L.J. 2028, 2034 (2011) (“At the Founding and until 1821, when Connecticut passed a law 
criminalizing abortion, abortion was legal throughout the United States if performed before quick-
ening.”). 
 2.  For example, some states have mandated that women seeking abortions be provided with 
information regarding possible risks before going through with the procedure. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 65-5709 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 
171.012 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.). Several states require a waiting period after 
mandatory counseling, which in some states may be as long as three days. See, e.g., MONT. CODE 
ANN. § 50-20-106 (West, Westlaw through July 1, 2015 Sess.); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-305 (West, 
Westlaw through 2015 Gen. Sess.). Several other states impose requirements on abortion clinics 
including specified procedure room size and corridor width. 410 IND. ADMIN. CODE 26-17-2 (West, 
Westlaw through Aug. 5, 2015); 28 PA. CODE § 29.33 (2015).  
 3.  Gillian E. Metzger, Abortion, Equality, and Administrative Regulation, 56 EMORY L.J. 
865, 871 (2007). 
 4.  Id. at 875. “In addition to such targeted regulation of abortion, evidence exists of general-
ly applicable health regulations, in particular licensing requirements, being applied against abortion 
clinics in a discriminatory fashion.” Id. (discussing Planned Parenthood of Greater Iowa, Inc. v. 
Atchison, 126 F.3d 1042 (6th Cir. 1997)). In Planned Parenthood of Greater Iowa, Inc. v. Atchison, 
the Sixth Circuit held that Iowa enforced its certificate of need statute disproportionately against 
abortion clinics in order to prevent women from obtaining abortion services. 126 F.3d 1042, 1048-
49 (6th Cir. 1997). Iowa had demonstrated a history of allowing similar medical offices to continue 
2
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been a great increase in the number of new abortion restrictions passed 
by state legislatures.5 There were more abortion restrictions enacted by 
state legislatures between 2011 and 2013 than there were in the entire 
previous decade.6 By 2014, the rate at which these laws were passed ap-
peared to be slowing down.7 However, this does not necessarily mean a 
victory for the pro-choice movement. Rather, it may mean that pro-life 
lawmakers have succeeded in accomplishing their goals through re-
strictions passed in previous years.8 
This Note will discuss a particular class of TRAP laws: those that 
require an abortion provider to have admitting privileges with a local 
hospital. Abortion providers frequently experience difficulty in affiliat-
ing with local hospitals. As a result, the clinics they operate are forced to 
close for failing to comply with state regulations.9 Abortion clinics and 
providers have challenged these provisions in state and federal courts, 
seeking to enjoin their enforcement and, ultimately, to obtain an order 
invalidating the regulations.10 In six states, admitting privilege laws have 
been temporarily enjoined pending a final decision in the courts, and one 
state’s statute has been permanently enjoined.11 
 
operating without obtaining a certificate of need. Id.  
 5.  Lane Florsheim, Here’s Proof That the Anti-Abortion Movement is Winning, THE NEW 
REPUBLIC (July 30, 2014) (internal quotations omitted), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/
118897/pro-life-movement-winning-abortion-battle-arizona-mississippi (“We’ve seen 226 abortion 
restrictions enacted over the past four years.”).  
 6.  More State Abortion Restrictions Were Enacted in 2011-2013 Than in the Entire Previ-
ous Decade, GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE (Jan. 2, 2014), https://guttmacher.org/media/
inthenews/2014/01/02/index.html.  
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Olga Khazan, The Difficulty of Getting an Abortion in Texas, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 14, 
2014, 8:00 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2014/01/the-difficulty-of-getting-an-
abortion-in-texas/283045/. See also Associated Press, Wisconsin Abortion Providers Challenge Law 
on Admitting Privileges, THE GUARDIAN (May 27, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2014/may/27/wisconsin-abortion-providers-challenge-law-trial.  
 10.  See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Servs. v. Abbott, 951 F. Supp. 2d 
891 (W.D. Tex. 2013); Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 963 F. Supp. 2d 858 (W.D. 
Wis. 2013); Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Currier, No. 3:12cv436-DPJ-FKB, 2012 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 90393 (S.D. Miss. July 1, 2012).  
 11.  State Policies in Brief: Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers, GUTTMACHER 
INSTITUTE (August 1, 2014), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/
spib_TRAP.pdf. Alabama (injunction granted in Planned Parenthood Se., Inc. v. Strange, 33 F. 
Supp. 3d 1330 (M.D. Ala. 2014)); Kansas (temporary restraining order granted pending outcome of 
litigation in Hodes & Nauser v. Moser. Order Granting Temporary Restraining Order Pending Hear-
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The federal circuits have disagreed with one another regarding the 
constitutionality of admitting privilege restrictions, creating an emerging 
split and an opportunity for the issue to reach the Supreme Court.12 In 
Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Van Hollen, the Seventh Cir-
cuit upheld an injunction against enforcing a state statute containing an 
admitting privileges requirement.13 In Planned Parenthood of Greater 
Texas Surgical Health Services. v. Abbott, the Fifth Circuit reversed an 
injunction against enforcing an admitting privileges requirement.14 In 
Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Currier, however, a different panel of 
Fifth Circuit judges upheld an injunction against enforcing an admitting 
privileges requirement that would close the sole abortion clinic in the 
state.15 A conflict between the federal circuits is a primary criterion for 
the Supreme Court to grant certiorari.16 
This Note concludes that enforcement of an admitting privileges 
requirement would close many abortion clinics, effectively eliminating a 
woman’s access to abortion services in particular localities and, thus, in-
trude impermissibly on a woman’s right to privacy. This Note further 
concludes that imposing a statutory requirement that abortion providers 
obtain privileges at a local hospital is effectively a violation of both pro-
 
11.pdf); Louisiana (temporary restraining order blocked enforcement in June Med. Servs., LLC v. 
Caldwell, No. 3:14-cv-00525-JWD-RLB, 2014 WL 4296679 (M.D. La. Aug. 31, 2014)); Mississip-
pi (injunction upheld in Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Currier, 760 F.3d 448, 459 (5th Cir. 
2014)); Oklahoma (enjoined by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in Burns v. Cline, 339 P.3d 887 
(Okla. 2014)); Texas (in Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, 135 S. Ct. 2923 (2015), the Supreme 
Court stayed the mandate issued by the Fifth Circuit in Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 
563 (5th Cir. 2015) pending the timely filing and disposition of a petition for writ of certiorari); and 
Wisconsin (permanent injunction granted in Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 94 F. 
Supp. 949 (W.D. Wis. 2015).  
 12.  See Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Currier, 760 F.3d 448 (5th Cir. 2014) (upheld dis-
trict court’s grant of preliminary injunction on the grounds that the statute would close the sole re-
maining abortion clinic in the state, placing a substantial burden on Mississippi women’s ability to 
obtain abortions—a constitutional right that cannot be delegated to an adjacent state); Planned 
Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 748 F.3d 583 (5th Cir. 2014), reh’g, 
en banc, denied, No. 13-51008, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 19280 (5th Cir. 2014) (reversing an injunc-
tion against enforcing an admitting privileges requirement finding no undue burden on a woman’s 
ability to obtain abortions); Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d 786 (7th Cir. 
2013) (upheld district court’s grant of injunction on opining that the state’s refusal to give a reason-
able time for abortion providers to comply was an undue burden on the ability of women to obtain 
abortions). 
 13.  Van Hollen, 738 F.3d at 799. 
 14.  Abbott, 748 F.3d at 587 [hereinafter Abbott II]. The Fifth Circuit previously reviewed this 
case in a separate appeal. Planned Parenthood of Greater Rex Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 734 
F.3d 406 (5th Cir. 2013) [hereinafter Abbott I]. 
 15.  Jackson Women’s Health Org., 760 F.3d at 459. 
 16.  Ryan Stephenson, Note, Federal Circuit Case Selection at the Supreme Court: An Empir-
ical Analysis, 102 GEO. L.J. 272 (2013).  
4
Akron Law Review, Vol. 49 [2015], Iss. 1, Art. 7
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol49/iss1/7
07 GLASS MACRO (DO NOT DELETE) 11/16/2015  1:25 PM 
2016] NOT IN MY HOSPITAL 253 
cedural and substantive due process rights of the physician by impermis-
sibly depriving a physician of the property interest in his medical li-
cense. Moreover, such statutes delegate state powers to regulate the 
medical profession to private institutions in an impermissible manner; a 
violation of the non-delegation clause. 
Part II of this Note explains the concept of an admitting privileges 
requirement and its significance to the regulation of abortion providers 
by state governments. In Part III, the Note explains the standard estab-
lished by the Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey17 for determining when states may legitimately 
impose restrictions on the right to abortion and concludes that federal 
courts of appeal have inconsistently applied the standard established in 
Casey. Part IV concludes that, without further clarification by the Su-
preme Court, the courts of appeal should conclude that these admitting 
privileges requirements violate Casey’s undue burden standard. Part IV 
also explains that such requirements deprive abortion providers of a 
property interest in the scope of their medical practice without due pro-
cess of law. The Note ultimately concludes that this issue is ripe for re-
view and that the Supreme Court should resolve the issue in the near fu-
ture. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that a woman’s right 
to an abortion is a fundamental privacy right guaranteed by the due pro-
cess clause of the Constitution.18 
In 1973, the Supreme Court decided Roe v. Wade, which, depend-
ing on one’s perspective is either the most famous or the most infamous 
of all the abortion rights cases.19 Roe v. Wade presented a constitutional 
challenge to a Texas statute, which criminalized abortions in that state 
unless they were procured for the purposes of saving the mother’s life.20 
The Supreme Court held that the Texas statute violated a woman’s right 
to privacy guaranteed by the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.21 Importantly, the Court also recognized that the states 
 
 17.  Casey’s undue burden test was adopted by a plurality of the court in the joint opinion by 
Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 
878 (1992) (plurality opinion).  
 18.  See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Casey, 505 U.S. 833; Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 
U.S. 124 (2007).  
 19.  Roe, 410 U.S. 113.  
 20.  Id. at 117-18.  
 21.  Id. at 164. 
5
Glass: Not in My Hospital
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2015
07 GLASS MACRO (DO NOT DELETE) 11/16/2015  1:25 PM 
254 AKRON LAW REVIEW [49:249 
have a compelling interest in protecting fetal life after viability.22 
In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its 
key holdings in Roe v. Wade.23 Planned Parenthood had challenged the 
constitutionality of five provisions of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control 
Act of 1982.24 The Supreme Court held some provisions to be valid and 
others invalid after applying an undue burden standard to assess the con-
stitutionality of laws that impact a woman’s access to an abortion proce-
dure.25 The Court recognized that “all abortion regulations interfere to 
some degree with a woman’s ability to decide whether to terminate her 
pregnancy.”26 It concluded that, in regulating abortion, the state must not 
place a substantial obstacle in the way of a woman seeking an abortion 
of a nonviable fetus.27 Writing jointly in a plurality opinion, Justices 
O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter applied a type of intermediate scrutiny, 
recognizing that states have an important interest in protecting potential 
life and in the regulation of medical procedures, but also that a state can-
not pass unnecessary regulations that have the purpose or effect of an 
undue burden.28 The undue burden test uses a two-part analysis by 
which courts are to determine: “(1) whether the statute has a purpose of 
placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abor-
tion, and (2) even if the purpose of the regulation is a valid state interest, 
whether the law has such an effect.”29 Although the undue burden stand-
ard was set out by only three of the justices in Casey, it has since be-
come the authoritative standard used by the Supreme Court in reviewing 
statutes regulating abortion.30 
Part II.A provides background regarding the varying levels of scru-
tiny that the Supreme Court applies in assessing the constitutionality of 
 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (plurality opinion). 
 24.  Id. at 844. 
 25.  See id. at 874. The Pennsylvania statute contained the following provisions: an informed 
consent requirement; a 24-hour waiting period requirement; parental consent provisions for minors; 
reporting and recordkeeping requirements; and a spousal notice requirement. Id. at 902 (appendix to 
opinion of Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter containing 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3203 et seq. 
(1990)). The Court upheld all provisions of the Pennsylvania statute except for the requirement that 
a woman notify her spouse before obtaining an abortion. Id. at 893.  
 26.  Id. at 875.  
 27.  Id. at 877. 
 28.  Id. at 878. 
 29.  Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 769 F.3d 330, 337 
(5th Cir. 2014). 
 30.  See e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 
(2000); Barnes v. Mississippi, 992 F.2d 1335 (1993); see also Gillian E. Metzger, Unburdening the 
Undue Burden Standard: Orienting Casey in Constitutional Jurisprudence, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 
2025 (1994). 
6
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statutes, and Part II.B explores the level of scrutiny that the Supreme 
Court has applied to legislation restricting the right to abortion. Part II.C 
then delves into the meaning and purpose of the admitting privilege stat-
utes that are the focus of this Note. 
A. Judicial Levels of Scrutiny for Assessing the Constitutionality of 
Statutes 
Principally at issue in this emerging circuit split is the level of judi-
cial scrutiny that should be applied by the courts in determining the con-
stitutionality of legislation that restricts the right to abortion.31 To deter-
mine the appropriate level of scrutiny, it is important to understand how 
the differing levels of judicial scrutiny of legislation developed and how 
those levels of review differ. This will require a brief historical overview 
of landmark cases, beginning with McCulloch v. Maryland32 and the so-
called means-end test, which became the basis for rational scrutiny that 
applies to any law that “neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infring-
es fundamental constitutional rights.”33At the opposite end of the judi-
cial scrutiny spectrum is strict scrutiny, a much more exacting scrutiny 
that originated in Justice Stone’s discussion in footnote four of United 
States v. Carolene Products Co.34 Finally, the Supreme Court has also 
invoked an intermediate scrutiny, an elevated level of scrutiny that falls 
somewhere in between rational basis review and strict scrutiny, and has 
applied it to laws that discriminate on the basis of alienage, gender, and 
mental disability, to name a few.35 The federal courts are now working 
to clarify which level of scrutiny should apply to statutes that restrict the 
right to abortion. 
In McCulloch v. Maryland, the Supreme Court analyzed Congress’ 
power under the necessary and proper clause of the United States Con-
stitution.36 Article I, Section 8, Clause 18 of the Constitution provides 
that Congress shall have all powers “necessary and proper for carrying 
into Execution . . . the Powers vested by this Constitution in the Gov-
 
 31.  See Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Servs. v. Abbott, 951 F. Supp. 2d 891 
(W.D. Tex. 2013); Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 963 F. Supp. 2d 858 (W.D. 
Wis. 2013); Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Currier, No. 3:12cv436-DPJ-FKB, 2012 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 90393 (S.D. Miss. July 1, 2012). 
 32.  McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819). 
 33.  F.C.C. v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993). 
 34.  United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
 35.  Jay D. Wexler, Defending the Middle Way: Intermediate Scrutiny as Judicial Minimal-
ism, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 298, 300, 316-19 (1998).  
 36.  McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 418. 
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ernment of the United States.”37 In one of his most famous opinions, 
Chief Justice Marshall reasoned that in reviewing congressional action, 
the courts should ascertain whether the means adapted by Congress 
“tended directly to the execution of the constitutional powers of the gov-
ernment.”38 Any means that reasonably relate to the execution of consti-
tutional powers are in and of themselves constitutional.39 McCulloch es-
tablished the rational basis level of scrutiny in American constitutional 
jurisprudence, which is a low standard requiring only that Congress’s 
effectuating legislation bear a rational relationship to a permissible con-
stitutional end.40 
In 1938, in footnote four of his opinion in United States v. Carolene 
Products Co., Justice Stone introduced the notion that certain pieces of 
legislation may be subject to more exacting judicial scrutiny than that 
imposed under the rational basis test.41 Justice Stone was among those 
justices who felt that a strong presumption of constitutionality should 
prevent the Court from intervening in anti-majoritarian issues.42 Critics 
of ‘heightened scrutiny’ see this as the Court imposing its own economic 
and social values on the legislature and invading what is the proper con-
cern of the democratic process.43 The more exacting judicial scrutiny 
standard of review that Justice Stone referred to is now commonly re-
ferred to as strict scrutiny review.44 Under strict scrutiny review, the law 
is presumed unconstitutional unless it is narrowly tailored to achieve a 
compelling state interest and is likely to achieve that interest.45 It is ap-
plied in limited categories of cases, including those that involve a law 
that infringes on a fundamental right such as the right to marital priva-
cy.46 
Intermediate scrutiny is a stricter standard than rational basis re-
 
 37.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. cl. 18. 
 38.  McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 419. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  United States v. Wang Kun Lue, 134 F.3d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 1997) (“[T]he ‘plainly adapted’ 
standard requires that the effectuating legislation bear a rational relationship to a permissible consti-
tutional end.”). 
 41.  United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
 42.  J.M. Balkin, Symposium: Law and Social Theory: The Footnote, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 275, 
297 (1989). 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  Id. at 305 (“Stone’s revolutionary approach had hardened into an equal protection doc-
trine featuring two tiers of scrutiny, where government action either received no review at all or a 
virtually irrebuttable presumption of unconstitutionality.”). 
 45.  See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301-02 (1993).  
 46.  Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1975). 
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view, yet it falls below the most stringent standard of strict scrutiny.47 
The classic formulation of the intermediate scrutiny standard is that the 
law being assessed must be substantially related to the achievement of 
an important governmental objective.48 Since it was established in Craig 
v. Boren, intermediate scrutiny has been criticized as giving rise to in-
consistent holdings and judicial activism.49 Others have defended inter-
mediate scrutiny as a useful method of resolving analogical crises.50 An-
alogical crises occur when it would be difficult or impossible for a court 
to decide a set of cases using either strict scrutiny or rational basis stand-
ards of review.51 Intermediate scrutiny is an important tool used by 
courts to establish limited holdings based on the facts of the particular 
case presented to a court.52 
Intermediate scrutiny has been described as a form of judicial min-
imalism that helps courts work through difficult and controversial is-
sues.53 Judicial minimalism allows courts to “decide no more than they 
have to decide . . . doing and saying as little as necessary to justify an 
outcome.”54 As a form of judicial minimalism, intermediate scrutiny can 
help protect the democratic process and ensure that democratically ac-
countable bodies decide highly complex issues rather than appointed 
judges.55 Exercising judicial minimalism tends to result in less social 
upheaval over court decisions and promotes gradual, deliberative 
change.56 By using intermediate scrutiny, courts decide cases more nar-
rowly and with fewer rippling effects.57 Deciding cases narrowly and in 
a fact-specific manner, as permitted by intermediate scrutiny, also per-
mits the Court more easily to alter prior decisions without violating the 
principle of stare decisis when societal norms and values can no longer 
tolerate those holdings.58 
 
 47.  Wexler, supra note 35, at 300. 
 48.  Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 769 F.3d 330, 336 
n.3 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing Wengler v. Druggist Mutual Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980)). 
 49.  Wexler, supra note 35, at 301 (citing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976)) (Chief Justice 
Rehnquist criticized the plurality’s application of an intermediate scrutiny standard.). 
 50.  Id. at 319 (citing Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term—Foreword: The 
Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 61-65 (1992).  
 51.  Wexler, supra note 35, at 319. 
 52.  Id. at 323. 
 53.  Id. at 302. 
 54.  Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court 1995 Term—Foreword: Leaving Things Undecid-
ed, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 6 (1996). 
 55.  Id. at 38. 
 56.  Wexler, supra note 35, at 304. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Id. at 310. 
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There are, however, certain negative implications of using interme-
diate scrutiny as a form of judicial minimalism.59 First, by leaving ques-
tions open and unanswered, lower courts bear greater decision costs.60 
When a court’s limited holding leaves a law uncertain, lower courts are 
less able to expeditiously dispense with cases in which litigants seek to 
ascertain the meaning, scope, and boundaries of the law to clarify its un-
certainty.61 Second, judicial minimalism “may threaten the ideal of the 
rule of law in certain circumstances by allowing lower courts to treat 
similarly situated parties differently.”62 
In some cases, it may be more appropriate for the court to find the 
middle way between rational basis and strict scrutiny review but in a 
manner that is also distinct from intermediate scrutiny.63 As discussed 
below, the undue burden standard, which governs when assessing the 
constitutionality of regulating abortion, may provide another form of in-
termediate scrutiny. 
B.  Judicial Levels of Scrutiny for Assessing the Constitutionality of 
State Statutes Regulating Abortion 
In Roe v. Wade, the Court established that abortion restriction stat-
utes should be evaluated by a strict scrutiny level of review.64 The Court 
held that a woman has a fundamental right to an abortion.65 Legislation 
may limit fundamental rights only if there is a compelling state inter-
est.66 Additionally, any legislation limiting fundamental rights “must be 
narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake.”67 
However, there are early signs of the Court’s shift away from strict scru-
tiny in the concurring and dissenting opinions of Roe. In his concurring 
opinion, Justice Stewart questioned whether the state’s interest justified 
the abridgment of a woman’s personal liberty.68 He referred to this re-
 
 59.  Id. at 305. 
 60.  Id.  
 61.  See generally Sunstein, supra note 54, at 16-19. 
 62.  Wexler, supra note 35, at 305.  
 63.  See Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 112 (1992) and Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 
(1983), for two cases that applied a standard of review that did not fall within the standards strict 
scrutiny, rational basis, or intermediate scrutiny.  
 64.  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973). 
 65.  Id. at 152-53. 
 66.  Id. at 155 (citing Kramer v. Union Free Sch. District, 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969); Shapiro 
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); and Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963)). 
 67.  Id. at 155-56 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1975); Aptheker v. 
Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 508 (1964); and Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307-08 
(1940)).  
 68.  Id. at 169 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
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view as a “particularly careful scrutiny” required by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.69 Justice Stewart would not apply a higher form of scruti-
ny, as did the majority. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Rehnquist also 
wrote that a woman’s ability to procure an abortion is not a right, but is 
instead a liberty that a woman may be deprived of only with due process 
of law.70 Justice Rehnquist applied the traditional test in his dissent in 
Roe and determined that the law was constitutional because it bore a ra-
tional relation to a valid state objective.71 
In City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, the Su-
preme Court reaffirmed its previous holdings in Roe, and, again, the jus-
tices differed over the appropriate level and type of scrutiny for abortion 
rights.72 The majority reaffirmed Roe and applied a strict scrutiny level 
of review to the challenged abortion regulations.73 Writing for the major-
ity, Justice Powell noted that the dissenting Justices would have used ra-
tional basis or, if deemed appropriate, heightened scrutiny to uphold any 
abortion-inhibiting regulation based on the state’s interest in preserving 
potential life—an analysis that Justice Powell found to be “wholly in-
compatible with the existence of a fundamental right recognized in Roe 
v. Wade.”74 
In her dissenting opinion in City of Akron, Justice O’Connor first 
proposed the undue burden standard that would later become the mid-
level standard by which abortion regulations are measured.75 In Justice 
O’Connor’s view, not every abortion regulation “must be measured 
against the State’s compelling interest and examined with strict scruti-
ny.”76 Justice O’Connor instead pushed for a different test by which the 
Court would determine if an abortion regulation infringed the woman’s 
right substantially or heavily burdened the right before applying a 
heightened scrutiny.77 The undue burden requirement would serve as a 
threshold test that must be conducted before the Court imposes on the 
state the burden of proving that its legislative actions were in furtherance 
of a compelling interest of the state.78 In the majority opinion in City of 
 
 69.  Id. (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (opinion dissenting from dismissal of 
appeal)). 
 70.  Id. at 172-73 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 71. Id. at 173. 
 72.  City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 420 (1983). 
 73.  Id.  
 74.  Id. at 420 n.1.  
 75.  Id. at 463 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 76.  Id. at 461. 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Id. at 463. 
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Akron, Justice Powell noted that the dissent would likely uphold almost 
any abortion regulation under a rational basis test.79 In Justice Powell’s 
view, applying Justice O’Connor’s undue burden standard would “up-
hold virtually any abortion-inhibiting regulation because of the State’s 
interest in preserving potential human life.”80 
Ultimately, in the 1992 opinion, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, Jus-
tice O’Connor, writing jointly with Justices Kennedy and Souter, put the 
undue burden standard in force. In Casey, Justice O’Connor joined the 
plurality to conclude that an abortion regulation will be deemed invalid 
if “in a large fraction of the cases in which [it] is relevant, it will operate 
as a substantial obstacle to a woman’s choice to undergo an abortion.”81 
In the Casey Court’s dissenting opinions, there is evidence of the 
controversy surrounding the undue burden test.82 In Justice Blackmun’s 
dissenting opinion, he defended the Court’s position in the Roe decision 
that strict scrutiny should supply the level of scrutiny for statutes regu-
lating abortion.83 Justice Blackmun wrote that “today, no less than yes-
terday, the Constitution and decisions of this Court require that a State’s 
abortion restrictions be subjected to the strictest judicial scrutiny.”84 He 
believed that precedent required the Court to apply a strict scrutiny 
standard to all non-de minimis abortion regulations.85 Strict scrutiny, 
Justice Blackmun concluded, provides the strongest protection and en-
sures that a woman’s right to make her own reproductive choices will be 
free from state coercion.86 Justice Blackmun went on to opine that be-
cause the Court had invalidated almost identical provisions in the past, 
the doctrine of stare decisis required the Court to strike down the provi-
sions of the challenged Pennsylvania statute.87 
In his dissent in Casey, Chief Justice Rehnquist also challenged the 
plurality’s adoption of an undue burden standard.88 Justice Rehnquist 
criticized the standard as an “unjustified constitutional compromise.”89 
 
 79.  Id. at 420 n.1 (majority opinion).  
 80.  Id. (Powell used the words “heightened scrutiny” in referring to O’Connor’s undue bur-
den standard). 
 81.  Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 895 (1992) (plurality opinion). 
 82.  Id. The plurality opinion was written by Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter. Id. at 
843. Justices Stevens, Blackmun, C.J. Rehnquist, and Scalia all authored opinions which concurred 
in part with the joint opinion, and dissented in part with the joint opinion. Id. at 912-1002. 
 83.  Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  
 84.  Id. at 926. 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Id. at 930. 
 87.  Id. at 934. 
 88.  Id. at 945 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 89.  Id.  
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Furthermore, he expressed concerns that the Court had become increas-
ingly more divided on how to deal with challenges to abortion regula-
tions.90 Justice Rehnquist noted a state of confusion amongst the lower 
courts as to the proper application of standards of judicial review that the 
Court should address. In his view, however, not only was the undue bur-
den analysis adopted by the plurality wrong, the Roe Court’s use of strict 
scrutiny was also erroneous.91 According to Justice Rehnquist, American 
history simply cannot sustain the conclusion that the right to an abortion 
is fundamental under the Fourteenth Amendment.92 He would, thus, 
have subjected legislation imposing restrictions on the right to abortion 
only to the lowest level of scrutiny, that is, rational basis scrutiny.93 
C. The Meaning and Purpose of Admitting Privileges 
To fully assess the constitutionality of state regulations requiring 
that abortion providers have admitting provisions at local hospitals, it is 
important to understand what admitting privileges are and how admitting 
privileges requirements impose restrictions on abortion providers. Ad-
mitting privileges—also called staff privileges—allow a physician to 
admit and treat patients at a particular hospital.94 State and federal regu-
latory bodies that license hospitals require that each hospital appropriate-
ly grants privileges to every physician before allowing the physician to 
admit patients or provide services in that hospital.95 The Joint Commis-
sion on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO), a non-
profit organization that accredits and certifies hospitals, has recommend-
ed certain minimal screening procedures; but hospitals are permitted to 
set their own standards for granting privileges.96 When granting admit-
 
 90.  Id. at 950. 
 91.  Id. at 953. 
 92.  Id. at 952-53. 
 93.  Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that “a woman’s interest in having an abortion is a form of 
liberty protected by the Due Process Clause, but States may regulate abortion procedures in ways 
rationally related to a legitimate state interest.” Id. at 966. 
 94.  Craig W. Dallon, Understanding Judicial Review of Hospitals’ Physician Credentialing 
and Peer Review Decisions, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 597, 605 (2000). “[S]taff privileges serve to delimit a 
doctor’s authority to practice in the hospital based upon the doctor’s overall competence in his par-
ticular field(s) of practice.” Id. (quoting Englestad v. Virginia Mun. Hosp., 718 F.2d 262, 267 (8th 
Cir. 1983)). 
 95.  Id. at 646. 
 96.  Robert A. Wise, OPPE and FPPE: Tools to Help Make Privileging Decisions, JC 
PHYSICIAN BLOG (Aug. 21, 2013), http://www.jointcommission.org/
jc_physician_blog/oppe_fppe_tools_privileging_decisions/. JCAHO recommends that hospitals 
implement two processes it has created for making privileging decisions: Ongoing Professional 
Practice Evaluation (OPPE) and Focused Professional Practice Evaluation (FPPE). 
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ting privileges, health care providers typically consider factors such as a 
physician’s competency, training, experience, malpractice history, and 
criminal history.97 The hospital has an important interest in ensuring 
quality of care and patient safety, so physicians are carefully vetted be-
fore admitting privileges may be granted.98 
In 1973, Congress passed the Church Amendments, which, under 
certain circumstances, protect physicians from discrimination on the ba-
sis of their performance or non-performance of abortions.99 The Church 
Amendments, and other similar provisions, are sometimes referred to as 
conscience clauses because they protect religious beliefs and moral con-
victions as they pertain to components of the Public Health Service 
Act.100 On the issue of hospitals granting abortion providers admitting 
privileges, the Church amendments provide that a hospital receiving fed-
eral money under the Public Health Service Act may not: 
[D]iscriminate in the extension of staff or other privileges to any phy-
sician or other health care personnel, because he performed or assisted 
in the performance of a lawful sterilization procedure or abortion . . . 
or because of his religious beliefs or moral convictions respecting 
sterilization procedures or abortions.101 
Although federal law protects physicians seeking admitting privi-
leges from being discriminated against on the basis of their performance 
of an abortion, obtaining admitting privileges can be difficult for abor-
tion providers for a variety of other reasons. For example, some hospi-
tals require that physicians admit a certain minimum number of patients 
per year.102 A requirement of 10 or 12 admissions per year is a relatively 
 
 97.  See, e.g., MERCY HEALTH, MERCY HOSPITAL MEDICAL STAFF CREDENTIALING MANUAL 
16 (2014), available at http://e-mercy.com/images/pdfs/resources/
credentialingmanualapprovedjanuary242008.pdf; MCLAREN HEALTH CARE, MEDICAL STAFF 
CREDENTIALING MANUAL 13 (2012), available at http://www.mclaren.org/
uploads/public/documents/
macomb/documents/medical%20staff%20services/ms%20Credentials%20Manual.pdf.  
 98.  See MERCY HEALTH, supra note 97, at 17. “Each department must have a system for the 
development of delineation criteria, the adjustment of criteria to meet developing community needs 
and the state of medical knowledge, and the monitoring of delineated privilege.” Id. “At a mini-
mum, this system must make quality of patient care its main design objective.” Id. 
 99.  SECRETARIAT OF PRO-LIFE ACTIVITIES, THE U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, 
CURRENT FEDERAL LAWS PROTECTING CONSCIENCE RIGHTS (Sep. 2014), available at 
http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/religious-liberty/conscience-protection/upload/Federal-
Conscience-Laws.pdf.  
 100.  Id. 
 101.  Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C.S. § 300a-7(c)(1)(B) (LEXIS through PL 114-49). 
 102.  Veronica Zaragovia, What It Takes for Texas Abortion Doctors to Get Admitting Privi-
leges, KUT.ORG (Feb. 19, 2014, 8:50 AM), http://kut.org/post/what-it-takes-texas-abortion-doctors-
get-admitting-privileges.  
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high threshold for an abortion provider to meet.103 Abortions are typical-
ly performed outside of the hospital setting in outpatient clinics, and it is 
rare for complications to arise that would require admitting the patient to 
a hospital.104 One study showed that only 0.05% of abortion procedures 
resulted in a complication that would require the patient to be admitted 
to a hospital.105 Statistically, abortions are safer than some outpatient 
procedures performed by physicians who are not required by the state to 
have admitting privileges at a local hospital.106 Hospitals also typically 
require physicians to establish local residency.107 This requirement may 
be particularly onerous if a physician chooses not to live near the clinic 
in which she works due to fears of harassment.108 In the past, abortion 
clinics and providers have been the target of violent protests and even 
instances of domestic terrorism.109 Some physicians are unable to meet a 
local residence requirement because they live in another state, and one 
Alabama physician could not meet the requirement because he lived in 
another country.110 
 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  Id.  
 105.  Tracy A. Weitz et al., Safety of Aspiration Abortion Performed by Nurse Practitioners, 
Certified Nurse Midwives, and Physician Assistants Under a California Legal Waiver, 103 AM. J. 
PUB. HEALTH 454, 459 (2013) (Out of 11,487 abortion procedures being evaluated, California re-
searchers found that only 6 procedures required hospital-based care.). See also Genevra Pittman, 
Medical Abortions Are Safe: Study, REUTERS HEALTH (Dec. 20, 2012, 5:28 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/20/us-medical-abortions-are-safe-study-
idUSBRE8BJ1CW20121220 (Of 233,805 abortions during the study, 135 women were admitted to 
a hospital with no fatalities.).  
 106.  Julie Rovner, FAQ: The Next Abortion Battle: the Courts and Hospital Admitting-
Privilege Laws, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Aug. 8, 2014), http://kaiserhealthnews.org/news/abortion-
admitting-privileges-fight/.  
 107.  Brian Lyman, Alabama Abortion Law Unconstitutional, Judge Rules, USA TODAY (Aug. 
4, 2014, 12:31 PM) http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/08/04/alabama-
abortion/13574467/ (discussing requirements physicians must meet before a hospital grants admit-
ting privileges).  
 108.  Id. 
 109.  See Amanda Terkel & Laura Bassett, Planned Parenthood Bombed in Wisconsin, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 9, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/02/planned-parenthood-
bomb-wisconsin_n_1396665.html (A Wisconsin Planned Parenthood was minimally damaged in 
2014 after an individual placed a homemade explosive device outside a window sill.); Matt Smith, 
Doctor Who Performed Abortions Shot to Death, CNN (June 2, 2009), 
http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/05/31/kansas.doctor.killed/index.html?iref=mps (Dr. George 
Tiller was shot and killed while serving as an usher at his church nearly 16 years after surviving a 
shooting outside his Wichita clinic.); Violence Statistics and History, NAT’L ABORTION FED’N, 
http://prochoice.org/education-and-advocacy/violence/violence-statistics-and-history/ (last visited 
Feb. 7, 2015) (The National Abortion Federation has tracked and compiled statistics on violence 
against abortion providers since 1977.). 
 110.  Jay Reeves, Judge: Ala. Abortion Clinic Law Unconstitutional, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 
4, 2014, 3:55 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/judge-ala-abortion-clinic-law-unconstitutional (dis-
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As of July 2015, eleven states have enacted laws requiring that an 
abortion provider must have admitting privileges with a local hospital at 
the time the physician performs an abortion procedure.111 From state to 
state, there is relatively little variation in the language of these stat-
utes.112 Most of these states impose a more specific requirement that the 
abortion provider obtain admitting privileges at a hospital located within 
thirty miles of where the abortion is to be performed.113 The statutes and 
administrative code provisions contain language typified by Texas’ stat-
ute: 
An abortion may not be performed by any person other than a physi-
cian who is using applicable medical standards and who is licensed to 
practice in this state. All physicians performing abortion procedures 
must have admitting privileges at a hospital located within thirty miles 
[42.28 kilometers] of the abortion facility and staff privileges to re-
place hospital on-staff physicians at that hospital. These privileges 
must include the abortion procedures the physician will be performing 
at abortion facilities.114 
Four of the eleven states—Missouri, North Dakota, Tennessee, and 
Utah—have admitting privileges requirements currently enforced.115 In 
six of the remaining states—Alabama, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
Oklahoma, and Texas—admitting privileges statutes are temporarily en-
joined pending the outcome of litigation, and Wisconsin’s admitting 
privileges statute was permanently enjoined.116 In some cases, the stat-
 
cussing Alabama physicians who could not meet residency requirements imposed by local hospitals 
because they lived out of the state or out of the country).  
 111.  State Policies in Brief: Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers, supra note 11. Six 
state statutes are temporarily enjoined pending a final decision in the courts, and one is permanently 
enjoined. In addition, there are nine states that have passed statutes requiring either admitting privi-
leges or an alternative agreement between an abortion provider and a local hospital. Id.  
 112.  See MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-75-1 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.); TENN. CODE. 
ANN. § 39-15-202 (West, Westlaw through 2015 First. Reg. Sess.); UTAH ADMIN. CODE. § R432-
600 (West, Westlaw through Jul. 1, 2015). 
 113.  See ALA. CODE § 26-23E-4 (West, Westlaw through Act 2015-499 of the 2015 Reg. 
Sess.); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-4a04 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.); LA. STAT. ANN. § 
40:1299.35.2 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess.); MO. ANN. STAT. § 188.027 (West, Westlaw 
through 2015 Reg. Sess.); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-02.1-04 (West, Westlaw through 2013); 
OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-748 (West, Westlaw through First Reg. Sess. of the 55th Leg.); TEX. 
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.0031 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.); WIS. STAT. 
ANN. § 253.095 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Act). 
 114.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-04. 
 115.  State Policies in Brief: Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers, supra note 11. See 
MO. ANN. STAT. § 188.027; N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-04; TENN. CODE. ANN. § 39-15-202; and 
UTAH ADMIN. CODE. § R432-600. 
 116.  State Policies in Brief: Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers, supra note 11. See 
16
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utes require compliance only days after the governor signs them into 
law.117 This adds an almost insurmountable hurdle for physicians to ob-
tain admitting privileges at most hospitals as the process takes at a min-
imum two or three months to complete.118 
III.  INCONSISTENCY IN FEDERAL TREATMENT OF ADMITTING 
PRIVILEGES REQUIREMENTS 
A. The Federal Courts of Appeal Have Held Inconsistently in Response 
to Challenges to State Statutes Imposing Admitting Privileges 
Requirements 
In Part III.A.1 this Note discusses the cases in which federal courts 
have held that admitting privilege statutes impose an undue burden on a 
woman’s right to an abortion. Part III.A.2 discusses those cases in which 
the Fifth Circuit has upheld admitting privileges statutes as constitution-
al absent unique circumstances. Part B of this Note explains that the 
Fifth Circuit has analyzed admitting privileges statutes in a manner in-
consistent with the purpose of the Casey plurality’s undue burden stand-
ard. In Part III.C this Note explains that admitting privileges statutes 
cannot survive a properly applied undue burden analysis. 
1. Federal Courts Holding Admitting Privileges Statutes 
Unconstitutional 
In Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Van Hollen, Planned 
Parenthood challenged the constitutionality of Section 1 of 2013 Wis-
consin Act 37 (the Act).119 The Act prohibited a physician from perform-
ing an abortion without first obtaining admitting privileges at a hospital 
located within 30 miles of the place where an abortion would be per-
formed.120 If a physician performed an abortion in violation of the Act, 
 
ALA. CODE § 26-23E-4; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-4a04; LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.2; MISS. CODE 
ANN. § 41-75-1 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-748; TEX. 
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.0031; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 253.095.  
 117.  Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d 786, 788 (7th Cir. 2013) (ex-
plaining that the Wisconsin statute was signed on a Friday and required compliance by the follow-
ing Monday, and therefore did not provide adequate time for the physician to comply with the stat-
ute). 
 118.  Id. at 788. 
 119.  Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, No. 13-cv-465-wmc, 2013 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 110097, at *4 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 2, 2014), aff’d, 738 F.3d 786 (7th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 
No. 13-1127, 2014 U.S. LEXIS 4404 (June 23, 2014).  
 120.  Id. at *11 (citing WIS. STAT. § 253.095 (2014)). 
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the Medical Examining Board could investigate and discipline the phy-
sician, sometimes to the extent of revoking the physician’s license to 
practice medicine in the State.121 Planned Parenthood argued that the Act 
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.122 The 
District Court granted Planned Parenthood’s motion for preliminary in-
junction, rendering the Act unenforceable pending a decision on the 
merits.123 The District Court determined that the plaintiffs would almost 
certainly be irreparably harmed because of undue burden and health 
risks associated with additional travel to procure an abortion, as well as 
the possibility that women would be forced to consider an unregulated, 
illegal abortion as an option.124 The District Court also found that the de-
fendants failed to demonstrate “any reasonable relationship between ma-
ternal health and imposing this restriction.”125 On appeal, the Seventh 
Circuit court affirmed the District Court’s ruling.126 
In reviewing the District Court’s ruling, Seventh Circuit Judge 
Richard Posner applied Casey’s undue burden standard to balance the 
State’s justification for implementing the law against the burdens im-
posed on women seeking an abortion in that State.127 Judge Posner ex-
plained that “the feebler the medical grounds, the likelier the burden, 
even if slight, to be ‘undue’ in the sense of disproportionate or gratui-
tous.”128 The State relied on medical grounds as the primary justification 
for the Act.129 The State argued that if a woman were to require hospital-
ization due to complications from an abortion procedure, she would get 
better continuity of care if the doctor who performed the abortion proce-
dure had admitting privileges at a local hospital.130 Judge Posner stated 
that the evidence presented thus far in the case was feeble relative to the 
burden imposed on women seeking an abortion.131 Posner reasoned that 
the burden to women seeking an abortion was great because abortion 
 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  Id. at *4. 
 123.  Id. at *4-5. 
 124.  Id. at *70. 
 125.  Id. 
 126.  Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d 786, 799 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 127.  Id. at 798. 
 128.  Id. Circuit Judge Manion issued a concurring opinion calling for a two-part test, which 
would include a rational basis threshold test followed by an undue burden analysis. Id. at 799 (inter-
nal citation omitted) (“[L]egislation regulating abortions must past [sic] muster rational basis review 
and must not have the practical effect of imposing an undue burden on the ability of women to ob-
tain abortions.”) (internal citation omitted).  
 129.  Id. 
 130.  Id. at 789. 
 131.  Id. at 798. 
18
Akron Law Review, Vol. 49 [2015], Iss. 1, Art. 7
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol49/iss1/7
07 GLASS MACRO (DO NOT DELETE) 11/16/2015  1:25 PM 
2016] NOT IN MY HOSPITAL 267 
providers could not possibly comply with the Act within a reasonable 
period of time.132 On remand from the Seventh Circuit, Judge William 
Conley ordered that the Wisconsin statute was unconstitutional under the 
Fourteenth Amendment and granted Planned Parenthood’s motion for 
permanent injunction.133 
Similarly, in August of 2014, Judge Myron Thompson in the West-
ern District of Alabama declared that the State’s admitting privileges re-
quirement imposed an undue burden on a woman’s right to an abor-
tion.134 In Planned Parenthood Southeast, Inc. v. Strange, the court used 
a “[balancing] approach, taking account of both the protected liberty of 
the woman and the important interests of the state.”135 The court found 
that physicians working at five Alabama abortion clinics would be una-
ble to obtain admitting privileges at a local hospital and that finding re-
placement physicians for these clinics would be a tremendously difficult 
task.136 In determining the severity of the obstacle posed by the closure 
of abortion clinics, Judge Thompson applied the following five factors in 
his analysis of the real world circumstances surrounding the admitting 
privileges regulation:137 First, the means by which the regulation oper-
ates the right to obtain an abortion; second, the nature and circumstances 
of the women affected by the regulation; third, the availability of abor-
tion services, both prior to and under the challenged regulation; fourth, 
the kinds of harms created by the regulation; and fifth, the social, cultur-
al, and political context.138 
2.  The Fifth Circuit Holds that Admitting Privilege Statutes Are 
Constitutional, Absent Unique Circumstances 
In Planned Parenthood of Greater Texas Surgical Health Services. 
v. Abbott, Planned Parenthood sued the State of Texas, contending that 
admitting privileges portion of Texas House Bill 2 (H.B. 2) was uncon-
stitutional.139 H.B. 2 required a physician performing an abortion to have 
 
 132.  Id. 
 133.  Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 94 F. Supp. 949, 998 (W.D. Wis. 2015), 
appeal docketed, No. 15-1736 (7th Cir. Apr. 6, 2015).  
 134.  Planned Parenthood Se., Inc. v. Strange, 33 F. Supp. 3d 1330, 1342 (M.D. Ala. 2014). 
 135.  Id. at 1337. 
 136.  Id. at 1343. 
 137.  Id. at 1342 (citing Planned Parenthood Se., Inc. v. Strange, 9 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1288-90 
(M.D. Ala. 2014)). 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  Abbott II, supra note 14, at 587. Planned Parenthood challenged two provisions of the 
Texas bill, but for the purposes of this article I will only address the challenge to the admitting privi-
leges requirement. The second provision placed restrictions on medication abortions. Id. 
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admitting privileges at a hospital within 30 miles of where the abortion 
procedure was to be performed.140 Planned Parenthood challenged this 
provision on four grounds in the district court.141 First, Planned 
Parenthood argued that the provision violated patients’ substantive due 
process rights because it placed an undue burden on a woman’s access to 
abortion services.142 Second, it argued that the provision violated a phy-
sician’s procedural due process rights because it failed to give physicians 
sufficient time to comply.143 Third, it argued, in enacting the statute, the 
Texas legislature unlawfully delegated legislative authority to hospi-
tals.144 Lastly, Planned Parenthood argued that the provision was uncon-
stitutionally vague.145 
The District Court ruled that the provisions of H.B. 2 were uncon-
stitutional after applying a two part test: first analyzing the law under ra-
tional basis review and then applying Casey’s undue burden standard. 
Finding that the medical evidence did not support a connection between 
an admitting privileges requirement and the state’s interest in protecting 
the health of women and unborn children, the District Court held that the 
admitting privileges requirement failed under rational basis review.146 
The court went on to say that even if the state law passed rational basis 
review, it would still place an undue burden on a woman’s access to 
abortion services because the law provided no time for physicians to 
comply.147 The court, thus, granted Planned Parenthood’s request for in-
junctive relief.148 
In Abbott I, a motions panel of the Fifth Circuit stayed the injunc-
tion granted by the Western District of Texas pending an expedited 
briefing and oral arguments on the merits.149 The panel reasoned that the 
 
 140.  Abbott II, supra note 14 at 587. 
 141.  Id. 
 142.  Complaint at 27, Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 
951 F. Supp. 2d 891 (W.D. Tex. 2013) (No.1:14CV00284). 
 143.  Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum of Law in Support 
Thereof, Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 951 F. Supp. 2d 891 
(W.D. Tex. 2013) (No.1:13CV00862). 
 144.  Complaint, supra note 142, at 28. 
 145.  Complaint and Application for Preliminary and Permanent Injunction at 28, Planned 
Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 951 F. Supp. 2d 891 (W.D. Tex. 2013) 
(No.1:13CV00862). 
 146.  Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 951 F. Supp. 2d 
891, 900 (W.D. Tex. 2013).  
 147.  Id. 
 148.  Abbott II, supra note 14, at 587. 
 149.  Abbott I, supra note 14, at 419. The Supreme Court denied application to vacate the stay 
though Justice Scalia wrote a concurring opinion in which he dissented from the Court’s refusal to 
vacate the stay. Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 134 S. Ct. 
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State would likely be able to show that the admitting privileges require-
ment had a rational basis because “there was evidence that such a re-
quirement would assist in preventing abandonment by the physician who 
performed the abortion.”150 The Abbott I panel went on to say that the 
State would also likely succeed in showing that the admitting privileges 
requirement did not place an undue burden on a woman’s access to abor-
tion services.151 The motions panel reasoned that women could travel to 
another part of Texas in order to obtain an abortion.152 The panel also 
suggested that some hospitals do not have minimum annual admissions 
requirements, so even if an abortion provider admits zero patients in a 
given year, the physician might still be eligible for admitting privileg-
es.153 In granting the stay, the motions panel found that the State would 
likely succeed on the merits.154 
In Abbott II, the Fifth Circuit reviewed the challenged provisions of 
H.B. 2 on the merits and upheld them as constitutional, granting judg-
ment for the State.155 The court ruled that the District Court applied “the 
wrong legal standards under rational basis review and erred in finding 
that the admitting privileges requirement amounts to an undue burden 
for a ‘large fraction’ of women” in the state.156 The panel reasoned that, 
under rational basis review, courts need only to find that some conceiva-
ble rationale exists for the law’s enactment.157 The panel found that the 
Texas legislature clearly articulated rational objectives and that those ob-
jectives were tied to its desire to protect abortion patients’ health.158 The 
Abbott II panel went on to say that the law did not place an undue bur-
den on a woman’s ability to obtain abortion services.159 The merits panel 
explained that women living in the areas affected by abortion clinic clo-
sures would still be able to travel to other counties in order to obtain an 
abortion.160 The panel, however, noted that some women would be re-
quired to travel more than one hundred miles to obtain abortion services, 
and that these women would be exempted from the State’s 24-hour wait-
 
506 (2013) Justice Scalia stated, “I would maintain the [District Court’s injunction] while the lower 
courts consider this difficult, sensitive, and controversial legal matter.” Id. at 509. 
 150.  Abbott I, supra note 14, at 411. 
 151.  Id. at 416. 
 152.  Id. at 415. 
 153.  Id. at 416. 
 154.  Id. at 411. 
 155.  Abbott II, supra note 14, at 590. 
 156.  Id.  
 157.  Id. at 594 (citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)).  
 158.  Id. 
 159.  Id. at 598. 
 160.  Id.  
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ing period requirement.161 The Fifth Circuit concluded that “an increase 
of travel of less than one hundred and fifty miles for some women is not 
an undue burden under Casey.”162 The court further noted that ninety 
percent of Texas women would be able to obtain an abortion within one 
hundred miles of their respective residence, and thus, the Texas law did 
not constitute an undue burden in a large fraction of relevant cases.163 
The Fifth Circuit denied plaintiffs’ petition for rehearing en banc.164 
Fifth Circuit Judge Dennis wrote a dissenting opinion in which he ad-
monished his colleagues for what he saw as a misapplication of the un-
due burden standard set out by the Supreme Court in Casey.165 Judge 
Dennis asserted that the Abbott II panel gave “only a modicum of scruti-
ny,” showing “abject deference” to state authority, and minimizing the 
important constitutional rights of the individual.166 Judge Dennis argued 
that the Abbott II panel had an obligation to follow Casey’s undue bur-
den test and that the panel decision conflicted with the Supreme Court’s 
decision.167 Judge Dennis warned that “if not overruled, the panel’s un-
due burden test will continue to exert its precedential force in courts’ re-
view of challenges to similar types of recently minted abortion re-
strictions in Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi.”168 Judge Dennis 
contended that the panel should have weighed and balanced the burdens 
imposed on Texas women seeking an abortion against the State’s justifi-
cation for implementing an admitting privileges requirement.169 If the 
State’s justification is not robust enough to warrant the obstacles placed 
in the way of women seeking an abortion, then the burden is undue.170 
Judge Dennis explained that this test was so crucial because it “lies at 
the very heart of Casey”.171 The Casey plurality expressly rejected both a 
strict scrutiny and rational basis review, and the balancing test was cen-
tral to the undue burden test adopted in the joint opinion authored by 
Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter.172 Judge Dennis would have 
affirmed the District Court’s conclusion that the Texas law imposed an 
 
 161.  Id.  
 162.  Id. 
 163.  Id. (quoting Abbott I, supra note 14).  
 164.  Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 769 F.3d 330, 331 
(5th Cir. 2014).  
 165.  Id. (“[T]he panel opinion flouts the Supreme Court’s decisions in [Casey].”). 
 166.  Id. at 332. 
 167.  Id. at 333. 
 168.  Id. at 332. 
 169.  Id. at 335. 
 170.  Id.  
 171.  Id. at 365. 
 172.  Id. at 359 (citing Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 146 (2007)).  
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undue burden on women seeking to obtain a pre-viability abortion and, 
thus, is unconstitutional.173 
In a strange turn of events, a different panel of the Fifth Circuit sub-
sequently upheld an injunction that declined to enforce an admitting 
privileges requirement in Mississippi.174 In Jackson Women’s Health 
Org. v. Currier, the sole remaining abortion clinic in the state of Missis-
sippi challenged the validity of an admitting privileges requirement.175 
The Fifth Circuit reasoned that the statute placed an undue burden on 
women seeking abortion services in Mississippi.176 Bound by stare deci-
sis to follow Abbott, the Fifth Circuit first applied a rational basis review 
and determined that the Alabama law was rationally related to a legiti-
mate state interest.177 However, the Fifth Circuit subsequently applied an 
undue burden standard to determine the validity of the law.178 In the dis-
trict court, the State argued that even if the only abortion clinic in Mis-
sissippi closed, a Mississippi woman could still travel outside the state to 
procure abortion services.179 In assessing this argument, the Fifth Circuit 
found that the fact that women may have access to nearby clinics in ad-
jacent states makes no difference in the analysis.180 
In Jackson, the panel determined that access to abortion clinics in 
adjacent states does not relieve the undue burden placed on women seek-
ing an abortion in the state of Mississippi.181 The court relied on a 1938 
Supreme Court decision, State of Missouri ex. rel. Gaines v. Canada.182 
In Gaines, an African-American was denied admission to the University 
of Missouri’s law school on account of his race.183 The University ad-
vised Gaines to take advantage of a tuition stipend provided for use at a 
law school in a neighboring state.184 Gaines challenged the decision, tak-
ing the issue to the Supreme Court.185 The Supreme Court held that “a 
state cannot lean on its sovereign neighbors to provide protection of its 
 
 173.  Id. at 366. 
 174.  Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Currier, 760 F.3d 448, 459 (5th Cir. 2014). 
 175.  Campbell Robertson & Erik Eckholm, Judges Block Abortion Curb in Mississippi, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 29, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/30/us/mississippi-abortion-clinic-federal-
court-blocks-closing.html?_r=0. 
 176.  Jackson Women’s Health Org., 760 F.3d at 449. 
 177.  Id. at 454.  
 178.  Id. at 455. 
 179.  Id.  
 180.  Id. 
 181.  Id. at 449. 
 182.  Id. at 457. 
 183.  Id. at 457. 
 184.  Id. 
 185.  Id. 
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citizens’ federal constitutional rights.”186 Relying on this language from 
Gaines, the Fifth Circuit holding in Jackson stands for the principle that 
in conducting an undue burden analysis of a state abortion regulation, 
the court may consider only the effect of the statute within the state it-
self. 
B. The Fifth Circuit Misapplied the Undue Burden Analysis 
The Fifth Circuit misapplied Casey’s undue burden standard. As 
Judge Dennis warned in his dissent in Abbott, a misapplication of the 
undue burden standard would result in setting precedent that would con-
flict with federal constitutional common law established by the Supreme 
Court in Casey.187 It is particularly troubling that the Fifth Circuit has so 
deviated from the standard as to completely frustrate the purpose of Ca-
sey’s balancing test.188 
In upholding the admitting privileges requirement in Abbott, the 
Fifth Circuit applied a low-level rational basis standard of review.189 
However, as discussed above, the Casey plurality intended that the un-
due burden test be applied as a measure of heightened scrutiny, falling in 
between the polar standards of strict scrutiny and rational basis re-
view.190 Indeed, the Casey plurality intended to strike a balance between 
the competing interests involved—a woman’s liberty interest against the 
state’s legitimate interest of protecting potential human life. The Casey 
plurality did not adopt any of the traditional levels of scrutiny—rational 
basis, intermediate scrutiny, or strict scrutiny—but instead applied a 
flexible balancing test in the undue burden standard.191 
The Casey plurality expressly stated that a state could not regulate 
abortions in all instances because “the liberty of the woman is at stake in 
a sense unique to the human condition and so unique to the law.” The 
abortion issue is, thus, particularly suitable for judicial minimalism. This 
is especially true when considering the development of the standard fol-
lowing the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade. The strict scrutiny 
 
 186.  Id. (citing Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 350 (1938)) (“[Equal protec-
tion under the law] is an obligation the burden of which cannot be cast by one State upon another, 
and no State can be excused from performance by what another State may do or fail to do.”). 
 187.  Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 769 F.3d 330, 
332(5th Cir. 2014). 
 188.  Abbott II, supra note 14, at 590.  
 189.  Id. at 593-94 (“The district court’s opinion took the wrong approach to the rational basis 
test. Nothing in the Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence deviates from the essential attributes of 
the rational basis test, which affirms a vital principle of democratic self-government.”). 
 190.  Supra, Background.  
 191.  Abbott, 769 F.3d at 336.  
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analysis in Roe has been slowly pared back by the Court as the analysis 
shifted away from the trimester test.192 With the Casey decision, the Su-
preme Court adopted the undue burden standard, which is an intensely 
fact-driven approach to reviewing state statutes for constitutionality.193 
C. Admitting Privileges Legislation Cannot Survive an Undue Burden 
Analysis 
The undue burden standard is a form of heightened scrutiny that re-
quires courts to balance an individual’s constitutionally protected liberty 
interests against the legislative purpose in enacting the abortion regula-
tion.194 The undue burden test uses a two-part analysis by which courts 
are to determine: “(1) whether the statute has a purpose of placing a sub-
stantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion, and (2) 
even if the purpose of the regulation is a valid state interest, whether the 
law has such an effect.”195 
Under the undue burden analysis, if an abortion regulation is passed 
with the purpose of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman 
seeking an abortion, then that legislation is unconstitutional.196 It can be 
difficult to ascertain the legislature’s intent in passing a statute, or from a 
different perspective, it would be relatively easy for legislatures to con-
ceal their true intent under the guise of protecting women’s health. The 
Supreme Court has, thus, identified several factors to consider when 
evaluating legislative purpose, including the language of the statute on 
its face, the statute’s legislative history, and interpretations of the statute 
by a responsible administrative agency.197 
It is relatively easy for a state to avail itself of the argument that an 
abortion regulation is designed to promote the health, safety, and welfare 
of women in the state. It is for this reason that Casey’s undue burden 
 
 192.  Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 837 (1992) (“Roe’s rigid trimester 
framework is rejected. To promote the State’s interest in potential life throughout pregnancy, the 
State may take measures to ensure that the woman’s choice is informed. Measures designed to ad-
vance this interest should not be invalidated if their purpose is to persuade the woman to choose 
childbirth over abortion. These measures must not be an undue burden on the right.”). 
 193.  Jonathan F. Will, MS Admitting Privilege Law Struck Down by 5th Circuit, BILL OF 
HEALTH: EXAMINING THE INTERSECTION OF LAW AND HEALTH CARE, BIOTECH, AND BIOETHICS, A 
BLOG BY THE PETRIE-FLOM CENTER AND FRIENDS (Jul. 30, 2014), 
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/billofhealth/2014/07/30/ms-admitting-privilege-law-struck-down-by-
5th-circuit/. 
 194.  Planned Parenthood Se., Inc. v. Strange, 33 F. Supp. 3d 1330, 1332 (M.D. Ala. 2014). 
 195.  Abbott, 769 F.3d at 337. 
 196.  Casey, 505 U.S. at 878. 
 197.  Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 594 (1987).  
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analysis is so crucial. The Casey standard gives force to a woman’s im-
portant liberty interest—recognized, since Roe, as within a woman’s 
right to privacy and constitutionally protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment—by providing that, even if a state may articulate a valid 
state interest in restricting abortion, the legislation will still be found un-
constitutional if it has the effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the 
path of a woman’s right to an abortion.198 
A statute has the effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path 
of a woman seeking an abortion if it creates obstacles to abortion ser-
vices in a large fraction of cases to which the statute applies.199 The Ca-
sey plurality did not specify exactly what would qualify as large fraction, 
and some courts have refused to consider what the Court might have 
meant by these terms.200 One court phrased its reluctance by refusing “to 
peer into the dark abyss of speculation in an attempt to determine at 
what point a fractional group becomes an impermissibly ‘large frac-
tion’ . . . .”201 
From another perspective, the Casey plurality exercised caution in 
refraining from setting a precise threshold or bright line as to what might 
be considered a large fraction. The purported vagueness as to this ele-
ment of the standard is really an important form of judicial minimalism. 
By not defining a large fraction, the Casey plurality allowed other courts 
to settle cases based on a fact-intensive inquiry of the individual case 
presented. Almost every federal circuit to address the issue has allowed 
the large fraction standard to remain open ended.202 Only the Fifth Cir-
cuit has declined to apply the large fraction test in facial challenges to 
abortion regulation statutes.203 In Barnes v. Moore, the Fifth Circuit ad-
 
 198.  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (“[T]his right of privacy, whether it be founded 
in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we 
feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment’s Reservation of rights to the 
people, is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnan-
cy.”). 
 199.  Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 895 (1992). 
 200.  A Woman’s Choice-E. Side Women’s Clinic v. Newman, 305 F.3d 684, 699 (7th Cir. 
2002). 
 201.  Id. 
 202.  Cincinnati Women’s Servs., Inc. v. Taft, 468 F.3d 361, 368 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Nat’l 
Abortion Fed’n v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 278, 294 (2d Cir. 2006); Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. 
Hicks, 409 F.3d 619, 628 (4th Cir. 2005); Planned Parenthood v. Heed, 390 F.3d 53, 57 (1st Cir. 
2004); A Woman’s Choice-E. Side Women’s Clinic, 305 F.3d at 687; Planned Parenthood of Cent. 
N.J. v. Farmer, 220 F.3d 127, 142-43 (3d Cir. 2000); Planned Parenthood of S. Ariz. v. Lawall, 180 
F.3d 1022, 1027, amended on denial of reh’g, 193 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 1999); Jane L. v. Bangerter, 
102 F.3d 1112, 1116 (10th Cir. 1996); and Planned Parenthood, Sioux Falls Clinic v. Miller, 63 
F.3d 1452, 1456-57 (8th Cir. 1995)). But see Barnes v. Moore, 970 F.2d 12, 14 (5th Cir. 1992). 
 203.  Cincinnati Women’s Services, 468 F.3d at 368 (citing Barnes v. Moore, 970 F.2d at 14 
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hered to the standard for reviewing facial challenges to a statute’s consti-
tutionality as established by the Supreme Court in United States v. Sa-
lerno.204 Disregarding the undue burden standard, the Fifth Circuit panel 
in Barnes held that plaintiffs challenging abortion regulation statutes 
must “establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the [stat-
ute] would be valid.”205 
In Abbott, the Fifth Circuit analyzed the constitutional challenge to 
the admitting privileges requirement imposed by the statute at issue un-
der Casey’s large fraction standard, but explicitly declined to indicate 
that it was abandoning pre-Casey standards set forth in the 1987 case, 
Salerno.206 The court “[did] not intimate” that it was not bound by its 
prior holding in Barnes to follow Salerno. Instead, the court assumed ar-
guendo that the large fraction test applied, and concluded that the state 
showed a strong likelihood of success on the merits.207 In the district 
court, the plaintiffs in Abbott presented evidence that, if the admitting 
privileges requirement were enforced, 22,000 women across Texas 
would be denied access to an abortion provider.208 The district court did 
not make such a finding, but instead found that 24 counties in the Rio 
Grande Valley would be without abortion providers.209 The district court 
also recognized that ninety percent of women seeking an abortion in 
Texas would have to travel 100 miles in order to obtain an abortion.210 
The Fifth Circuit held that it was not an undue burden to cause women 
seeking an abortion to travel 100 miles.211 In Abbott, the court said that 
“an increase in travel distance of less than 150 miles for some women is 
not an undue burden on abortion rights.”212 Additionally, the Fifth Cir-
cuit panel acknowledged the plaintiff’s argument that women who are 
not citizens may have visas that prevent them from traveling to seek an 
abortion. However, the Fifth Circuit summarily dismissed this argument 
as “unrelated to the hospital-admitting-privileges requirement.”213 
In finding that it is not an undue burden for a woman having to 
travel 100 to 150 miles to obtain an abortion, the Fifth Circuit declined 
 
(quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1992)). 
 204.  Barnes v. Moore, 970 F.2d at 14 (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 
(1992)). 
 205.  Id. 
 206.  Abbott I, supra note 14, at 414. 
 207.  Id.  
 208.  Id.  
 209.  Id. 
 210.  Id. at 415. 
 211.  Id.  
 212.  Id. 
 213.  Id. at 416. 
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to weigh the additional burden imposed by increased travel time and dis-
tance against the state’s legitimate interest in passing the regulation.214 
The Fifth Circuit instead summarily decided that “increased distances 
are categorically insufficient to constitute a substantial burden.”215 This 
reasoning would essentially allow the state to pass any abortion regula-
tion so long as the only impact was an increase in distance and travel 
time for a woman seeking an abortion, thereby neutralizing Casey’s un-
due burden standard. 
What the Fifth Circuit has made clear in Jackson is that a state may 
not lean on its sovereign neighbor to provide women access to abortion 
services when the effect of the abortion regulation is to foreclose a 
woman’s right to an abortion within the state.216 This decision, however, 
is not sufficient to bring the Fifth Circuit into compliance with the Casey 
standard. 
IV. IMPOSING ADMITTING PRIVILEGES REQUIREMENTS ON PHYSICIANS 
WHO PROVIDE ABORTION SERVICES RESULTS IN AN EFFECTIVE DENIAL 
OF THOSE PHYSICIANS’ SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS 
RIGHTS 
Admitting privileges statutes also present a substantive and proce-
dural due process issue in that these statutes impermissibly limit the 
scope of a physician’s property interest in his medical license. 
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states that no 
state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law.”217 Due process is an important constitutional guarantee 
that protects individuals from the arbitrary action of the government.218 
Due process protection should be understood as being composed of two 
subparts, procedural due process and substantive due process.219 Sub-
stantive due process protects individuals against the arbitrary exercise of 
legislative and executive power.220 On the other hand, procedural due 
process prohibits the government from arbitrarily depriving a person of 
 
 214.  Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 769 F.3d 330, 364 
(5th Cir. 2014). 
 215.  Id. 
 216.  Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Currier, 760 F.3d 448, 457 (5th Cir. 2014). 
 217.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added). 
 218.  J. Bruce Bennett, The Rights of Licensed Professionals to Notice and Hearing in Agency 
Enforcement Actions, 7 TEX. TECH. ADMIN. L.J. 205, 206 (2006). 
 219.  Id. (citing Patient Advocates of Tex., 136 S.W.3d at 658; Skelton v. Comm’n for Lawyer 
Discipline, 56 S.W.3d 687, 693 (Tex. App.14th Dist. 2001)). 
 220.  Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847 (1998) (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 
381 U.S. 479 (1975); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952)). 
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her property.221 The admitting requirements statutes violate both proce-
dural and substantive due process requirements. 
Courts use a two-part inquiry to determine if an individual’s sub-
stantive or procedural due process rights have been violated.222 First, 
courts inquire, under a substantive due process analysis, whether the 
plaintiff has been deprived of a protected interest in life, liberty, or prop-
erty.223 Second, courts consider, under a procedural due process analysis, 
whether the process used to deprive the plaintiff of his interest was defi-
cient as compared to the constitutionally required process with respect to 
that deprivation.224 If the court concludes that there is either a substan-
tive or a procedural due process violation, the statute is constitutionally 
infirm. 
A practical example illustrates the significant restrictions on a phy-
sician’s license created by the geographic, minimum-patient, and timing 
issues imposed by admitting privileges statutes. Consider the following 
scenario: a licensed physician offers abortion services at a clinic in 
Smalltown, Wisconsin.225 The closest hospital to his clinic is 40 miles 
away. In this scenario, the geographic requirements of the statute, which 
provide that the physician must have admitting privileges at a hospital 
within 30 miles of her clinic, prohibit the physician from operating her 
clinic.226 To continue operating the clinic, the physician would be sub-
ject to fines up to $10,000 each time an abortion is performed or induced 
or attempted to be performed or induced.227 
Now consider a slightly different scenario: a licensed physician of-
fers abortion services at a clinic in, Smalltown, Wisconsin. The closest 
hospital to his clinic is 20 miles away, within the 30-mile zone estab-
lished by the Wisconsin statute.228 The physician applies for admitting 
privileges at a local hospital. The local hospital grants staff privileges 
only to physicians who admit 50 patients or more to the hospital in a 
given year. In this scenario, the physician admits no more than one or 
two patients in a given year to the hospital, because, in most instances, 
 
 221.  Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 589 (1972). In his dissenting opinion, Justice Mar-
shall described procedural due process as “our fundamental guarantee of fairness, our protection 
against arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable government action.” Id. 
 222.  Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 23 F. Supp. 3d 956, 964 (W.D. Wis. 
2014); see also Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
 223.  Van Hollen, 23 F. Supp. 3d at 964. 
 224.  Id. 
 225.  Wisconsin being one of the states that passed a statute containing an admitting privileges 
requirement, WIS. STAT. ANN. § 253.095 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Act). 
 226.  Id. 
 227.  Id. 
 228.  Id. 
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the applicable standard of care does not require admitting a woman, who 
undergoes a successful abortion procedure, to a hospital. The physician 
is consequently denied admitting privileges at the local hospital because 
he does not meet the minimum patient requirement of the statute. As in 
the last scenario, the physician could not continue to operate his clinic 
without facing severe penalties. This Note argues, in Part IV.B below, 
that the minimum-patient requirement violates substantive due process 
protections under the United States Constitution. 
These examples illustrate how admitting privileges requirements 
can have sweeping effects on accessibility to abortion services within the 
state, and also how the requirements may limit the effectiveness of a 
physician’s license. Consider that the Texas admitting privileges re-
quirement closed nearly 40 clinics as of October 2014.229 Without the 
temporary relief granted by the Supreme Court, the Texas law would 
have shuttered all but eight abortion clinics in the nation’s second most 
populous state.230 
A. The Procedural Due Process Inquiry 
If a state statute deprives a person of her property without due pro-
cess of law, that statute must be held unconstitutional. Property interests 
are constitutionally protected, under the due process clause, although the 
Constitution is not the source of property rights. The Supreme Court has 
said that property interests arise instead from some other independent 
source of law.231 Property interests, such as the physician’s medical li-
cense, which is at issue in the admitting requirements statutes, come 
from “rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that sup-
port claims of entitlement to those benefits.”232 
Constitutionally protected property interests “extend well beyond 
actual ownership of real estate, chattels, or money”233 and include the 
medical licenses at issue in admitting privileges statutes. The Supreme 
 
 229.  Eyder Peralta & Chris Hopkins, Supreme Court Blocks Abortion Rules that Closed Most 
Clinics, NPR (Oct. 15, 2014, 12:27 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-
way/2014/10/15/356265077/supreme-court-blocks-abortion-rules-that-closed-most-texas-clinics.  
 230.  Bill Mears, Supreme Court Allows Texas Abortion Clinics to Reopen for Now, CNN (Oct. 
14, 2014, 8:23 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/14/politics/supreme-court-texas-abortion-clinics/. 
At 26,956,958 persons, Texas has the second largest population in the United States. See Florida 
Passes New York to Become the Nation’s Third Most Populous State, Census Bureau Reports, 
UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU (Dec. 23, 2014), http://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-
releases/2014/cb14-232.html.  
 231.  Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). 
 232.  Id. (for example, state law). 
 233.  Id. at 572. 
30
Akron Law Review, Vol. 49 [2015], Iss. 1, Art. 7
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol49/iss1/7
07 GLASS MACRO (DO NOT DELETE) 11/16/2015  1:25 PM 
2016] NOT IN MY HOSPITAL 279 
Court has long recognized that professional licenses are property inter-
ests within the protection of the Constitution.234 As early as 1889, the 
Supreme Court noted that “few professions require more careful prepa-
ration by one who seeks to enter it than medicine” and that “reliance 
must be placed upon the assurance given by [the physician’s] license, 
issued by an authority competent to judge in that respect, that he pos-
sesses the requisite qualifications.”235 It has been argued that profession-
al licenses are privileges rather than rights or entitlements.236 However, 
the Supreme Court has expressly declined to distinguish between rights 
and privileges when it comes to deciding whether a person can be pre-
vented from practicing under a professional license.237 
The state’s delegation of this power to hospitals is not, however, 
even the most serious constitutional problem.238 The most significant 
procedural due process problems arise when admitting privileges re-
quirements do not provide physicians sufficient time to come into com-
pliance with the newly imposed statutory requirement. 
As the Seventh Circuit observed, the timeline that a physician is 
given to comply with the admitting privileges requirement may be as lit-
tle as two days.239 This is in no way a long enough time to comply with 
the statute. It may take weeks or months to successfully obtain admitting 
privileges at a local hospital. If a physician does not meet the prelimi-
nary requirements for admitting privileges, it might take even more time 
for the physician to accomplish the changes that need to be made to her 
practice. This Note concludes that this timing limitation violates consti-
tutionally imposed limits on depriving physicians of their property in 
their medical license without procedural due process. 
The Supreme Court has considered when a process depriving a per-
son of their life, liberty, or property is constitutionally sufficient.240 An 
analysis of whether the procedure is sufficient, i.e., whether it meets the 
requirements of procedural due process, requires an analysis of the pri-
vate and governmental interests that are affected.241 In Mathews v. El-
dridge, the Supreme Court established a three-part test for determining 
 
 234.  Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 n.8 (1970) (citing Charles A. Reich, Individual 
Rights and Social Welfare: the Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245 (1965)). 
 235.  Dent v. W. Va., 129 U.S. 114, 122-23 (1889). 
 236.  Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs of N.M., 353 U.S. 232, 239 n.5 (1957).  
 237.  Id. 
 238.  See Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 23 F. Supp. 3d 956, 965 (W.D. Wis. 
2014).  
 239.  Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d 786, 788 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 240.  See, e.g., Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
 241.  Id. at 334 (quoting Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 167-68 (1974)). 
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when state and federal procedures meet due process requirements.242 In 
the abortion context, it is the private hospital that decides the procedures 
for issuing admitting privileges to physicians, but under operation of the 
state statute, the result of the procedures affects a physician’s property 
rights.243 The Eldridge test weighs and balances three factors: 
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; 
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through 
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or 
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s inter-
est, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative 
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would 
entail.244 
In this case, the physician’s property interest in his license to practice 
medicine is the private interest that will be affected by the official ac-
tion. A physician has a property interest not only in actually having a li-
cense to practice medicine, but also in the scope of that license.245 Con-
sidering the erroneous deprivation factor, it may not be easily argued 
that the deprivation would be erroneous because the property interest has 
now been conditioned on meeting the requirements of the statute and be-
cause the loss is automatic once the statute is violated. However, it can 
easily be argued that the value of additional or substitute procedural 
safeguards would substantially ease the injury to a physician’s property 
interest after she is denied admitting privileges. For instance, if the phy-
sician were given a lengthier statutory time period to comply, then the 
burden on the physician would not be nearly as great.246 As the statues 
are currently worded, an abortion clinic would have to close almost im-
mediately due to an inability to conduct business without facing prohibi-
tively high penalties.247 Alternatively, the legislature could pass legisla-
tion dictating under what circumstances a physician can be denied 
 
 242.  Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335. 
 243.  See Katherine A. Van Tassel, Blacklisted: the Constitutionality of the Federal System for 
Publishing Reports of “Bad” Doctors in the National Practitioner Data Bank, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 
2031 (2012) (describing due process issues in the hospital peer-review process). In the hospital 
peer-review process, private hospitals issue reports to the National Practitioner Data Bank operated 
by the Department of Health and Human Services, an administrative agency of the federal govern-
ment. Id. 
 244.  Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335. 
 245.  Van Tassel, supra note 243, at 2057. 
 246.  As the Seventh Circuit stated, “[T]here would be no quarrel with a one-year deadline for 
obtaining admitting privileges as distinct from a one-weekend deadline.” Planned Parenthood of 
Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d 786, 789 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 247.  See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 253.095 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Act). 
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admitting privileges.248 But even so, the government’s interest in health 
and safety is probably not furthered because so few patients actually 
need to be admitted to hospitals in connection with an abortion proce-
dure.249 
B. The Admitting Privilege Statutes Also Violate Substantive Due 
process Requirements 
Alternatively, the physicians who are forced by admitting privileges 
requirements to close their clinics have also been denied their substan-
tive due process. A state cannot exclude a person from practicing medi-
cine “in a manner or for reasons that contravene the Due Process or 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”250 A state, thus, 
may not condition a professional’s right to practice on a requirement that 
is not rationally connected to the person’s fitness or capacity to comply 
with the obligations and responsibilities of the profession.251 Admitting 
privileges requirements allow private hospitals to arbitrarily deny privi-
leges based on reasons that do not relate to a legitimate state interest. For 
example, if the hospital requires that the physician admit a certain num-
ber of patients each year to the hospital in order to obtain admitting priv-
ileges, this does not rationally relate to the state’s interest in promoting 
the health and safety of women in the state or to ensuring that the physi-
cian is fit to practice medicine.252 
It is perfectly rational for these hospitals to consider admitting 
numbers when making their decision to grant admitting privileges in or-
der, for example, to ensure that the hospital will not be overcrowded.253 
Staffing health care institutions is an important part of managing the 
hospital as a business, most importantly its liability to claims,254 but im-
posing minimum yearly admission requirements does not serve that pur-
pose: 
A health care institution, whether hospital, nursing home, or clinic is 
liable for negligence in maintaining its facilities; providing and main-
 
 248.  Although this would likely result in constitutional challenges brought on behalf of hospi-
tals. 
 249.  See Van Hollen, 738 F.3d at 790.  
 250.  Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs of N.M., 353 U.S. 232, 238-39 (1957).  
 251.  Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 23 F. Supp. 3d 956, 965 (W.D. Wis. 
2014). 
 252.  See id. 
 253.  See id. 
 254.  Barbara Cray, Due Process Considerations in Hospital Staff Privileges Cases, 7 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 217, 218 (1979). 
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taining medical equipment; hiring, supervising and retaining nurses 
and other staff; and failing to have in place procedures to protect its pa-
tients.255 
A hospital can be held liable for negligent hiring, staff shortages, and the 
negligence of physicians practicing there and, therefore, has an im-
portant interest in determining admitting privileges requirements.256 
These determinations are rational business decisions.257 
However, in the context of the instant abortion statutes, the hospi-
tal’s business decisions have a direct impact not only on a woman’s abil-
ity to obtain an abortion, but also on the scope of the physician’s license, 
which is an important property interest.258 Furthermore, the minimum 
admission requirements serve no counterbalancing medical or safety 
purpose. States do not have the power to prohibit a physician from per-
forming abortions merely because they have taken an anti-abortion 
stance and wish to prevent abortions from taking place in that state.259 
Furthermore, a state may not delegate the power to place a substantial 
obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion in the state because 
the state itself does not have that power.260 
When a hospital grants and denies admitting privileges based on its 
own business interests—however reasonable and necessary they may be 
for that hospital’s successful operation—it does not necessarily further 
any legitimate interest of the state.261 Requiring that the physician meet 
certain requirements set by the hospital before obtaining admitting privi-
leges does not necessarily support any legitimate interests of the state in 
passing an admitting privileges requirement. With respect to the instant 
admitting privileges statutes for abortion providers, for example, there 
does not seem to be any connection between the health of the women 
undergoing an abortion and a physician’s ability to admit a specific 
number of patients to a hospital in a given year. 
In Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Van Hollen, the Sev-
enth Circuit recognized the lurking issue of equal protection in granting 
 
 255.  BARRY R. FURROW, THOMAS L. GREANEY, SANDRA H. JOHNSON, TIMOTHY STOLZFUS 
JOST, & ROBERT L. SCHWARTZ, HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 438 (7th ed. 
2013). 
 256.  Id. 
 257.  See id. at 962. 
 258.  Id. 
 259.  Tucson Woman’s Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d 531, 556 (9th Cir. 2004).  
 260.  Id. (citing Hallmark Clinic v. N.C. Dep’t of Human Res., 380 F. Supp. 1153, 1158-59 
(E.D.N.C. 1974)). 
 261.  Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 23 F. Supp. 3d 956, 964 (W.D. Wis. 
2014). 
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admitting privileges based on the number of patients a physician is able 
to admit to a hospital in a given year.262 In 2012, the state of Wisconsin’s 
report on abortions indicated that only 1 out of every 608 abortions re-
sulted in complications that involved hospitalization.263 Based on this 
statistic, it is easy to see how difficult it might be for an abortion provid-
er to obtain admitting privileges at a hospital that requires a certain 
number of admissions per year. If a hospital required even two patients 
be admitted per year, it would mean that the abortion provider would ei-
ther have to admit patients who did not require hospitalization, wasting 
valuable resources and burdening the health care system, or the physi-
cian would have to perform more than 3 abortions per calendar day in 
order to meet the requirement by probability. The end result is inevitably 
a physician being deprived of his property interests. 
C. The Admitting Privileges Statutes Push the Boundaries of What is 
Appropriate Under the Non-Delegation Clause 
When states impose admitting privileges requirements, they condi-
tion the scope of the physician’s license on the physician’s ability to ob-
tain admitting privileges at a local hospital.264 In the cases discussed 
above, the plaintiffs challenging the admitting privileges requirements 
contend that the state legislatures have granted hospitals unfettered dis-
cretion in determining whether to grant admitting privileges to abortion 
providers.265 The plaintiffs alleged that the state impermissibly granted 
private parties—the hospitals—authority to deprive another person, the 
physicians at issue, of their right to life, liberty, or property without due 
process of law in violation of the non-delegation doctrine.266 The non-
 
 262.  Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d 786, 790 (7th Cir. 2013) 
(“[F]or states seem indifferent to complications from non-hospital procedures other than surgical 
abortions (especially other gynecological procedures), even when they are more likely to produce 
complications.”). 
 263.  Id. 
 264.  Hallmark Clinic v. North Carolina Dep’t of Human Res., 380 F. Supp. 1153, 1189 
(E.D.N.C. 1974). In this case, the physician’s license was conditioned on a physician’s ability to 
obtain a patient transfer agreement with a local hospital. 
 265.  See Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Servs. v. Abbott, 951 F. Supp. 2d 891 
(W.D. Tex. 2013); Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 963 F. Supp. 2d 858 (W.D. 
Wis. 2013); Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Currier, No. 3:12cv436-DPJ-FKB, 2012 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 90393 (S.D. Miss. July 1, 2012). 
 266.  See, e.g., Van Hollen, 23 F. Supp. 3d at 962. But see Women’s Health Ctr. v. Webster, 
871 F.2d 1377 (8th Cir. 1989) (“The requirement that physicians performing abortions obtain surgi-
cal privileges, which involves the independent action of a public or private hospital, poses no more 
significant threat to plaintiff’s due process right than the requirement that those performing abor-
tions be licensed physicians, which involves the independent action of a medical licensing board.”). 
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delegation argument prohibits states from “authorizing private citizens to 
deprive other private persons of life, liberty, or property without due 
process of law.”267 Courts have distinguished cases where the power to 
grant and deny admitting privileges is assigned to a state agency.268 The 
concern here is that hospital administrators will use or craft privileging 
requirements to effectively foreclose an abortion providers’ ability to ob-
tain privileges. On the non-delegation ground alone, the Court should 
conclude that the admitting privileges statutes are unconstitutional. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Abortion regulations that include admitting privileges requirements 
for physicians must be declared unconstitutional on two grounds. First, 
the statutes fail to satisfy the Casey plurality’s undue burden standard. 
Applying the effects test from Casey, the Supreme Court should resolve 
the emerging split in federal court decisions and conclude that the effect 
of an admitting privileges requirement places a substantial obstacle in 
the path of a woman lawfully seeking an abortion. Imposing an admit-
ting privileges requirement will result in the shuttering of abortion clin-
ics. When clinics close, abortion services may be made unavailable to a 
substantial fraction of women seeking abortion services. The Supreme 
Court should, thus, confirm that a state may not avail itself of an argu-
ment that women seeking abortion services may simply travel elsewhere, 
to another part of the state or to another state.269 If a state intends to ad-
vance its interest in protecting potential life by requiring abortion pro-
viders to obtain admitting privileges at a local hospital, it might avoid 
imposing an undue burden by adapting such statutes to allow physicians 
a reasonable time to do so.270 
The inconsistent application by the federal courts of appeals of Ca-
sey’s undue burden standard as applied to admitting privileges require-
ments in abortion regulations suggests that the Supreme Court should 
take up the issue in the near future. The Supreme Court must clarify the 
level of review to be applied to statutes and regulations that restrict abor-
 
 267.  Van Hollen, 23 F. Supp. 3d at 962 (quoting Beary Landscaping, Inc. v. Costigan, 667 F. 
Supp. 3d 956, 950 (7th Cir. 2012)). 
 268.  See, e.g., id. (“[S]ince the State of Wisconsin has delegated the licensing of physicians to 
the Wisconsin Medical Examining Board, a state entity, and as such in requiring a physician to be 
licensed to perform abortions, there is no delegation of any function to a private entity.”). 
 269.  See Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938); see also Planned Parenthood 
of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d 786 (7th Cir. 2013); and Planned Parenthood Se., Inc. v. 
Strange, 33 F. Supp. 3d 1330 (M.D. Ala. 2014). 
 270.  Van Hollen, 738 F.3d at 795-96. 
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tions. The undue burden standard has been misapplied by the Fifth Cir-
cuit as a rational basis test, contravening the intended meaning of Justic-
es O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter. Considering the history of the undue 
burden standard in Supreme Court case law, it is clear that the standard 
was intended to serve as a type of middle-level scrutiny, between the ra-
tional basis and strict scrutiny levels of review. 
Second, the statutory admitting privileges requirements imposed on 
physicians violate physicians’ Fourteenth Amendment rights to substan-
tive and procedural due process. The admitting privileges statutes at is-
sue, moreover, impermissibly delegate to hospitals the state’s power to 
regulate abortion services. While a hospital receiving federal funding 
may not discriminate against a physician in granting admitting privileges 
on the basis of the physician’s participation in an abortion, the hospital 
may deny privileges and, thus, unconstitutionally interfere with the phy-
sician’s property interest in her medical license, by setting requirements 
that an abortion provider is unable to meet. Furthermore, a hospital may 
not choose to deny privileges simply by stating that the denial will pro-
tect and promote patient welfare and safety. Finally, the admitting privi-
leges statutes violate physicians’ procedural due process rights if physi-
cians are not granted a reasonable time to secure admitting privileges at 
a local hospital, which may be impracticable. 
These issues are ripe for review, and the Supreme Court should of-
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